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Abstract
This paper is based on my final lecture as a professor of economics at Shobi Universi-
ty. I shall take this opportunity to talk about the distribution and welfare theory and about
my academic contributions to this theory１.
First, the development of the theory in income and asset distribution is considered.
One of my contributions in this field is a hypothesis on the long-term V -shaped curve
behaviour of the relative income share and another is a theorem on the optimum share of
wages. 
Second, I suggest possible reasons why the proportion of gross national asset to nation-
al income (or GDP) ratio tends to increase. In this paper, I suggest a possibility of the
long-term V-shaped as to the relative share of workers ' asset in the future. 
Third, alternative theories of stagflation are considered. As well known, in the 1970s
Milton Friedman explained stagflation by the adapted expectation hypothesis. In the be-
ginning of the 1970s I tried to explain an alternative cause of stagflation and the reversal
of Phillips curve by the differential increase rates between wages and labour productivi-
ty.  
Fourth, I explain the hypothesis on the role of social factors that influence production
and productivity increase. In 1983, at the International Conference on Productivity held
in Tokyo, I tried to testify the hypothesis by econometric methods. Social factors were
supposed to play an important role in the Japanese style of management.
Fifth, after introducing the development of pension plans in Japan, I show a theoretical
model that was used for the pension reforms.
Sixth, I introduce the development in making social indicators in Japan.
Last, I retrospect the development in the theory of welfare mix and show why the wel-
fare mix is necessary in enhancing efficiency and justice at the same time.
キーワード
（EU） （NATO）
Development of Theories on
Income and Asset Distribution
The first area of concern to me in economics
had to do with the distribution of income. In the
1960s, the share of wages in Japanese firms was
remarkably low compared with that in the firms of
highly developed countries such as the US and the
UK. For example, the share of wages２ of Toyota
automobile company in 1964 was 16%, while the
comparable figure for the big three automobile
companies in the US was more than 50 %. Why
were there such large differentials in the share of
wages?  This puzzling question was one of the rea-
sons why I chose income distribution as my first
study subject. At the end of the 1950s, I presented
a paper at the annual Conference of the Japanese
Association of Theoretical Economics and Econo-
metrics. I suggested as a hypothesis V-shaped
curve behaviour in the long-term share of wages３,
which, I learnt later, was similar to Simon Kuznets'
U-shaped curve on income distribution. I thought
that the share of wages deteriorates at the early
stage of economic development when an economy
grows rapidly. However, after a turning point, the
relative income share of wages begins to increase
again. 
With regard to historical transformation by
stage of economic growth, I was influenced by
the growth stage hypothesis suggested by W. W.
Rostow. From the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s,
the Japanese economy experienced a structural
transformation into a highly developed economic
stage (Maruo, 1962) . A structural change took
place in the labour markets, when a demand
shortage economy was transformed into a supply
shortage one as a result of the high rate of eco-
nomic growth. In the transitional period of this
transformation, changes in wage differentials by
firm size began to be seen. The wage differen-
tials, which subsequently became larger, began to
reduce in the 1960s. In addition, the share of
wages, which had been declining, began to in-
crease. The behaviour of the share of wages is as-
sumed to behave as shown in the V-shaped curve
in Chart 1 (Maruo, 1962; Kato and Maruo, 1963;
Maruo, 1965), which is similar to the Kuznets U-
shaped curve for personal income distribution
(Kuznets, 1955). There are several ways to explain
a declining trend in the share of wages during the
industrialization stage and an increasing trend af-
ter the turning point (Maruo, 1965 and 1975).
Firstly, as Arthur W. Lewis suggested, labour
markets change from an unlimited labour supply
to a limited supply (Lewis,1965).
Secondly, the increase in investment ratio and
the rate of economic growth as well as the capital
/ output ratio influence the share of wages. The
well-known relationship between the share of
wages and economic growth, investment ratio and
marginal capital/output ratio４ suggests that the
share of wages declines when the rate of econom-
ic growth and the investment ratio and the capital
/ output ratio increase. 
Thirdly, a feature of the industrialization stage
is the development of the heavy industry sector,
which needs a higher capital / labour ratio. The
increase of the relative weight of this sector will
entail a decline in the share of wages. However,
after the turning point it is the tertiary industry, in
which the share of wages is relatively high, that
develops. The changes in industrial composition
will influence the behaviour of the share of
wages.
It is highly probable that for these reasons the
share of wages tends to decrease during the indus-
trialization stage and increase in the transitional
period. As a result, a V-shaped curve as shown in
Chart 1 is observed. 
In the labour market, wage differentials by age
were decreasing as a trend from the beginning of
the 1960s.  The proportion of average wages of
20～24 year olds to the average wages of 50～
54 year olds increased from 19% in 1960 to
around 34% in the 1990s. A similar trend is ob-
served in the wage differentials by firm size. In
this respect, inequality in income distribution in
the working population decreased markedly com-
pared with the beginning of the 1960s. Also in the
same period, as mentioned above, the relative
share of labour increased. Common variables are
assumed to work behind the behaviour changes in
the share of wages and the wage differentials
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(Maruo, 1963; Maruo, 1965; Maruo, 2004).  
An Approach to the Optimum
Share of Wages
Along with the positive studies on the be-
haviour of the relative share of wages, there have
been normative studies on the share of wages.
Nicklas Kaldor, who was a professor at Cam-
bridge University when I stayed at the University
from 1972～1973, suggested the concept of an
equilibrium share of wages, which was assumed
to adjust the aggregate demand to a level equal
with the aggregate supply. I tried to develop the
theory of an equilibrium share of wages into the
theory of an optimum share of wages. Just as the
theory of optimum consumption assumes maxi-
mization of the present value of per capita con-
sumption over time, the optimum share of wages
theory assumes a share ratio that maximizes the
present value of wages in the long run.
Assuming that the investment of a company is
solely financed by profits of the company, an in-
crement of value added VO
001
depends on the share
of wages X as Eq.(1) shows;
( )V S v1p 1O = -v X
003
-----------------------------(1)
W VO O= X
004
----------------------------------------(2)
substituting (1) into VO
001
in Eq.(2) the dual effects
of X
002
are shown as Eq (3).
( )W S v1p 1O = -vX X -----------------------(3)
Differentiating Eq (3) with respect to X002 ,
/1 2=X ----------------------------------------(4),
where an matured economy is assumed and v is
assumed not influenced by X
002
. Under this most
simplified assumption, the share of wages that
maximizes the increment of wages is 
2
1007
. On the
other hand, the share of wages that maximizes the
present wages is, of course, 1.0. The actual opti-
mum share of wages is between these two cases.
The longer the period of employment that is as-
sumed the smaller the optimum share of wages
will become smaller. 
Assuming a simplified two-period lifecycle
model５, the present value of employees' total
compensation including bonus, fringe benefits of
employees in a company is 
*W W
t
W
11
2= +
+
008
--------------------------------(5),
where W
009
means total wages, t
010
implies the time
discount rate. *W
011
is the present value of
lifetime wages (including fringe benefits). The total
wages of each period are ( )V S V n1p1 1+ -vX X
Subscript figures denote a period. For example
denotes n1
012
in period 1 and denotes n2
013
in period
2. n is defined as /n n2 1 .
In the case of a simplified two-period model,
the optimum share of wages in the sense that
maximizes the present value of employees' life-
time income is deduced (Maruo, 2004).
Optimum share of wages * ( )}s n
t
2
1 1 1
p
= + +vX
014
-----------------------------------------------------(6),
where *W
011
: Present value of lifetime income,
W1
015
: Total wages including fringe benefits in
period 1, P : Profits, t
010
: Time discount rate, V
017
:
Value added, *X
018
: Optimum share of wages as
% of value added, sp
019
: Savings ratio of the
company profits, v : Productivity of investment.
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Chart 1  Hypothesis to explain the Trend in the Share of Wages W/Y
% 
Share of wages 
Under-developed �
stage
Industrialization stage Transitional�
period
Highly industrialized stage
Turning point  
Rate of economic growth 
Subscription 1 denotes period 1, and 2 denotes
period.2. /n n n2 1=
021
.
.V W P s1 p= + -
022
= pay-out ratio of profits. In
this simplified model, total wages are W W1 2+
Simplified Eq.(6) suggests that the optimum
share of wages decreases and approaches 1/2 as
n
013
, v and sp
019
increase, while the optimum
share of wages increases as time discount ratio t
increases. When n , sp
019
and v are sufficiently
large, the optimum share of wages approaches 1/2
(50%).This relationship is what I called the theo-
rem of the share of wages (Maruo, 1997). Once .J.
M. Keynes wondered why the share of wages re-
mained constant. And Allen Rucker found that
the share of wages in firms remained constant
around at 40% on average. The above-mentioned
mechanism may suggest a possible reason to sup-
port their findings.
In Japan, n
013
was large because of the practice
of lifetime employment. The dividend ratio
( )s1 p-
025
has been kept low. Because of the
mentality of the Japanese people as expressed in
the saying " senyuu kouraku (work and save at
present to enjoy later)", we may assume that t was
also low.
One of the reasons for the low share of wages
and low pay-out ratio in the 1950～ 1980s in
Japan that made the high rate of productivity
growth possible may partly be attributed to the ra-
tional behaviour of employees. They agreed to re-
strain the share of wages on the conditions men-
tioned above, i. e.high sp
019
, v and n, in order to
increase the size of "the future pie".
So far we have assumed that investment is fi-
nanced solely by the profits of the company.
When a part of the investment of a company is fi-
nanced by borrowed money, the relationship is
somewhat complex. Still the fundamental rela-
tionship and the optimum share of wages do not
change, if the interest paid on borrowed money is
counted as a part of profits.
However, if we assume that a part of the sav-
ings of the company is financed by the savings of
employees' compensation, an important change
takes place as to the savings function and the dis-
tribution of share ownership. The investment of a
company is now financed by the savings from
both profits and wages as the Kaldorian savings
function (7) shows. 
( ) ( )s s s s1p w w= - - +X --------------------- (7)
Therefore, Eq.(3) is modified into Eq.(8).
{( ) ( ) } .W V s s s1p w wO = - - +vX X
027
--------(8)
Differentiating Eq.(8) with respect to X002 , we
obtain the share of wages that maximizes the in-
crement of wages, when workers save and invest
their savings６. If sw > 0 continues, workers' as-
sets become larger and larger and the convention-
al class distinction between the capital owning
class and the working class will become obsolete. 
Optimum s s
s
2
1
p w
w= -X
029
--------------------------(9)
Eq.(9) shows that the share of wages that maxi-
mizes the increment of wages becomes higher
than 
2
1030
when sw is positive and s s
s
p w
w
-
031
>0.
The relation holds fundamentally with a two-peri-
od model. This implies that this condition is real-
ized and if the savings of employees are used to
finance investment, the optimum share of wages
to maximize the increment of wages increases and
therefore the share of wages that maximizes the
present value of the lifetime income of employees
will also increase. This implication is important
for solving or mitigating the trade-off relationship
between high productivity increase and equity for
employees .
Asset-Based-Depression
and Asset-Based Anti-Depres-
sion Policies
The second field in which I have been interest-
ed is asset-based economic policies.
At the beginning of the 1990s, both Sweden
and Japan fell into serious depression. 
Japanese experiences in the 1990 suggest that
new anti-depression policies are necessary to re-
cover from the new type of depression. In an era
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where the influences of assets have become so
large, neither a neo-classical policy nor a Keyne-
sian policy that are concerned mainly with man-
aging economic flows are sufficient. Positive as-
set-based policies are sometimes required to make
market mechanisms work well. The Swedish case
in the 1990s is of special interest when studying
policies at times of financial crisis (Maruo, 1996 ;
Suzuki, 1999; Maruo, 2002). 
In my paper in 1999 I wanted to suggest asset-
oriented economic policies as a means of coping
with financial and asset-based depression (Maruo,
1999 and March 2002).
Firstly, I suggested that at the first stage of fi-
nancial and asset-based depression, government
support for financial institutions in crisis was the
most effective device for overcoming this kind of
depression. Comparing the contrasting anti-de-
pression policies of Sweden with those of Japan is
most instructive. Sweden experienced the burst-
ing of its bubble in 1989 / 1990 and serious de-
pression in 1990～1993 with a negative growth
rate, falling asset prices, balance sheet consolida-
tion, financial fragility, unemployment and ex-
panding public deficits. The timing and experi-
ences of the bubble and bursting were similar to
those of Japan, but the policies adopted by both
countries contrasted with each other. In 1993, the
Japanese Government introduced a typical Key-
nesian anti-depression policy in the form of ex-
panding public works, while the Swedish Govern-
ment in 1993～94 spent 4.66% of GDP not on
public works but to support financial institutions.
The effects of anti-depression policies in the two
countries were impressive. The Swedish economy
recovered from depression in 1995, while the
Japanese economy was unable to recover from
stagnation. This experience seems to suggest that
asset policies such as separating "bad banks" from
"good banks" (Englund, 1999; Suzuki, 1999), inject-
ing new equity into banks in crisis, and issuing
guarantees to the bank owners for loans that en-
abled the banks to fulfil their capital requirements
are more effective than a Keynesian type of de-
mand expansion such as increasing government
expenditure for public works. We may interpret
this as being because asset effects on depression
are so large that without restoring asset markets
and improving the balance sheets of firms espe-
cially banks, there will be no recovery from the
asset-based depression. 
Asset effects on private consumption have been
well recognized and supported by empirical tests.
For example, in the case of Japan, the fluctuation
of private consumption in the period 1960～1999
is well explained by income and asset value
changes (Maruo, 1999 and 2000). Asset effects with
regard to private investment have been observed
as well, especially in recent years in Japan. Pri-
vate investment and private consumption will in-
crease as asset prices rise. 
When asset prices fall, not only the off-the-
book property of the balance sheet of banks but
also the net worth of banks reduces７, which, in
turn, reduces the lending ability of banks. Inject-
ing new equity into banks will increase their cred-
it functioning. In my paper in 1999, I explained
the possible effects of injecting new equity into
banks in financial difficulty by a simple mathe-
matical model based on the balance sheet of the
bank (Maruo, 1999 and 2002). 
We may assume that the neo-classical model
pushes down the aggregate supply curve to the
southeast as Chart 2 shows by pushing down the
costs of firms and the government sector. On the
other hand, the Keynesian demand-pull policies
pull up the aggregate demand curve in a north-
east direction. If the asset-based policy of inject-
ing public money into banks reduces the default
credit and increasing credit function of the banks,
the policy will pull up the aggregate demand by
increased investment. The best policy mix for as-
set-based depression is to reduce the supply costs
of firms and public sector on the one hand, while
pulling up aggregate demand by injecting public
money into banks on the other. 
If a larger portion of these financial assets were
to shift from small risk assets such as deposits and
government bonds, etc. to domestic stock as hap-
pened in the US and a few European countries in
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the 1990s, share prices would rise and if this were
to happen in Japan, the Japanese economy would
begin to develop again (Maruo, 1999 and 2002)
However, in Japan most personal financial assets
were held as safe deposits and private insurances.
In 2001, Japanese families held 1420 trillion yen
in personal financial assets. Most of these finan-
cial assets were owned as bank deposits, private
insurance policies and bonds. In 2002 investment
in company shares and mutual investment funds
amounted to only 4.3% and 2.3% respectively out
of the 1420 trillion yen. Moreover, most of the
huge public and occupational pension funds
amounting to several hundred trillion yen were
held as safety assets. Asset allocation in Japan
was far from the optimum allocation. Since then,
the Japanese economy has begun to recover. It is
too early to say that the policy mix since 2002
was effective. Still we can guess that the econom-
ic policy in depression has changed from a Neo-
classical or Keynesian policy to the above-men-
tioned policy mix. 
Alternative Explanation of
Stagflation in the 1960s and
1970s
Most economists have assumed and suggested,
either explicitly or implicitly, that a positive cor-
relation exists between the rate of economic
growth in real terms and the rate of price increas-
es. This relationship is sometimes called a trade-
off relationship between faster economic growth
and price stability.
However, the short-run relationship between
the rate of economic growth in real terms and
price increase which had been positive before
1960 reversed from the beginning of the 1960s to
a negative one. Such a change took place in some
of the highly industrialized countries such as the
United States, the United Kingdom, West Ger-
many and Japan. An analysis of the causes of this
reversal will be useful in explaining the causes of
"stagflation" in these countries around 1970.
The positive correlation between them was
quite clear for the period 1956～1961. 
. .
( . ) ( . )
.
P Y
R
2 961 0 5483
32 9 8 70
0 95
= - +
=
: :
032
-----------------(10).
Figures in parentheses under the co-efficient are t
statistics.
However, the relationship after 1962 was changed
into a negative one (Maruo, 1969).
For the period 1962-1969
. .
( . ) ( . )
.
P Y
R
8 337 0 249
8 26 2 76
0 72
= -
=
: :
---------------------(11),
where P
:
stands for the annual rate of consumer
price increases and Y
:
for the annual growth rate
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Chart 2  Aggregate Demand and Supply Curve 
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of GNP in real terms. If the price increase of im-
ported goods and services is added as another in-
dependent variable, the negative correlation is
clearer.
In those years of stagflation the existence of a
negative correlation between the rate of economic
growth and the rate of price increase was not an
exceptional phenomenon evident only in Japan.
Contrary to the conventional assumption, it
seemed that the negative correlation had become
more prevalent in the 1960s in several highly in-
dustrialized economies.
This paradoxical fact had been noticed by some
economists. For example in England, sir Roy Har-
rod pointed out :
"What is purely noteworthy is that during the
main periods of expansion there was no increase
in adjusted prices at all.
The price increases all came in the periods of
relative stagnation" (Harrod, 1967). Earlier than
that, Norman Macrae referred to the same phe-
nomenon (Macrae,1963).
I explained stagflation by reference to the
sticky wage increase and flexible productivity in-
crease. The rate of nation-wide labour productivi-
ty fluctuated in proportion to the rate of economic
growth, while wages were sticky and less sensi-
tive to it as Chart 3 A indicates. As a result, the
rate of price increase, which was an increasing
function of <the rate of wage increase - the rate of
labour productivity increase>, was larger when
the rate of economic growth was low (Maruo,
1969; 1972; Maruo, 1989) .
( )P F w y= -
: : :
----------------------------------- (12),
where P
:034
: Rate of price increase, w
:
: Rate of
wage increase in nominal term, y
:038
: Rate of
increase in nation-wide productivity.
In those days, when cost-push inflation was
dominant in the highly industrial countries espe-
cially in Europe, the above explanation from the
cost side was convincing.
Social Factors that Influence
Production and Productivity
Since the 1970s, I have worked at the Japan
A Contribution to the Theory of Distribution and Welfare［MARUO, Naomi］
9
Chart 3　A  Alternative Explanation of Stagflation 
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Productivity Center８ as one of the core research
members and I have had a number of opportuni-
ties to present and read my papers at international
conferences on productivity. The International
Productivity Symposium with its theme "Revital-
izing the World Economy through Improved Pro-
ductivity" held in Tokyo in 1983 began with Pro-
fessor Assar Lindbeck's key lecture. Professors
Solomon Fabricant, John W. Kendrick and I pre-
sented papers９ on productivity at the Symposium.
In my paper, I used econometric methods to ana-
lyze the factors that influenced productivity in-
crease. I emphasized that besides the increase of
capital / output ratio, value added / turnover ratio,
etc., social factors such as social integration and
cooperation based on communication and mutual
trust in labour management relations influenced
productivity functions and contributed to produc-
tivity improvement. Social factors are sometimes
difficult to express in quantitative units. To over-
come this difficulty I introduced two devices.
First, I used social and institutional  indicators to
quantify the differences in quality, institutions
and systems. For example, the spread of worker
participation in the system is indicated by the pro-
portion of those companies with joint consultation
systems, employee suggestion systems, etc., to to-
tal companies in the industry.
Another device I used to make quantitative in-
dicators of cooperation was the method of aggre-
gating those indicators. As the social factor indi-
cators are correlated to each other, multicollinear-
ity is inevitable. To evade this technical difficulty,
an aggregated social indicator was made by
adding up the standardized figures of ten indica-
tors, which represent the degree of cooperation,
communication and integration between labour
and management as well as among employees.
The regression formula on productivity in-
crease for 14 industries improved significantly.
Formula (13) shows the regression. The determi-
nation coefficient improved remarkably by adding
an aggregated social integration indicator as an
explanation variable (Fabricant et al, 1984).
. . .
( . ) ( . ) ( . )
.
( . )
.
y k v
s
R
302 1310 2 0618 3 2089
4 70 3 37 3 04
4 1231
3 84
0 8531
= - + +
-
+
=
: :
039
------(13)
y
:038
: Rate of labour productivity increase, k
:040
: Rate
of increase in the capital / output ratio, v
041
: the
value added / turnover ratio, s
042
: Aggregated
indicator of social factors
R. M. Solow suggested technological progress
and Harvey Libenstein suggested X-efficiency as
factors that influence production and productivity
functions. We may assume that social factors play
a similar role in production function to the role
played by technological progress, X-efficiency
and recently suggested social capitals. An econo-
metric analysis of social factors which improve
production that I attempted in the early 1980s
may have contributed to the development in pro-
duction economics. 
Pension Reform and Pen-
sion Models
In 1970, pension reform became one of the
concerns of economist. In 1975, as the chairman
of the Welfare Policy Committee set up by the
Japan Productivity Center, I edited a report on
pension reform. The report was published by the
Center in 1977. Before that, I published a paper
on a pension model. I tentatively made an actual
pension plan based on the model for the period
1975～2005 using the population forecast of the
Government (Maruo, 1973 and 1975).
The fundamental framework of the pension
model that was used for the pension plan was as
follows.
Assuming that a pay-as-you-go principle oper-
ates and that pension expenditure is financed by
the social insurance fee and the Government sub-
sidy of g % of pension benefits in each year, pen-
sion expenditure and pension revenue are as
shown in equations (14) and (15). 
B bNb=
043
------------------------------------------ (14) 
B yN G= +a
044
----------------------------------- (15) 
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The rate of social insurance fee a
045
that is
required to finances pension benefits is obtained
by solving the equations (10) and (16) by a045 . 
( )y
b
N
N g1b= -a
046
--------------------------------(16)
When a pension fund is managed by a funding
system, Eqs. (14), (15) and (16) are modified as
Eqs. (17), (18) and (19) (Maruo, 1975; Maruo,
1996年; Maruo, March, 2004) .
B bN Ab O= +
047
----------------------------------- (17) 
R yN iA G= + +a
048
----------------------------- (18) 
{ ( )} ( )y
b
N
N
B
A A i g1 1b= + - -a
:049
-----------(19), 
where A
050
: Pension fund balance, B
051
: Total
expenditure for pension benefits, R
052
: Total
revenue of pension benefits, b
053
: Pension benefits
per head, y
054
: Average income of those who
burden the pension expenditure, N
055
: Number of
those who burden the pension expenditures, Nb
056
:
Number of those who receive pension benefits,
AO : Increment of the pension fund = R B-
058
in
each year, A
:059
: Rate of increase in pension fund,
i
060
: Return rate of pension fund, G
061
: Government
subsidy, g
062
: Proportion of government subsidy to
total pension benefits.
I forecast the financial situation for 1975～
2005. As far as I know this was the first pension
plan in Japan based on a mathematical model
(1973 and 1975). 
Since then, more detailed pension models and
pension plans based on the models were drawn up
by the Government and by several economists in-
cluding myself. But the fundamental framework
of model has still not changed from the 1973
model that I made.    
Making Social and Welfare
Indicators,
At the beginning of the 1970s, thanks to fast
economic growth for two decades, the per capita
GNP (gross national product) of Japan approached
that of the level of European countries in terms of
the US dollar. It was at this point that Japanese
people suddenly realized that the level of welfare
and quality of life in Japan were still far behind
European countries. Their national goal then
changed from faster economic growth to a higher
standard of welfare and quality of life. I wrote a
book " The Post GNP Era" in 1971 reflecting this
kind of social mood. In the book, I suggested the
concept of GNW (gross national welfare) using so-
cial indicators. In fact, I constructed a tentative
GNW, which was an aggregate of social indica-
tors in 18 areas. Each indicator was converted in-
to a standardized score, and the scores were sim-
ply aggregated. At the beginning of the 1970s, as
a member of the research committee of Domei,
the National Organization of Trade Unions, and
later as a member of the Government Council of
National Life I also helped to make welfare indi-
cators.
In 1973 the Japanese economy experienced an
economic boom, and the social responsibility of
companies became a social concern. The Japan
Productivity Center set up a research committee
to study the problem. As the chairman of this
committee, I edited a report on social responsibil-
ity indicators. The report was published by the
Japan Productivity Center in 1974. One year later,
the Japanese Congress for Industry and Com-
merce set up a separate research committee on
corporate social contribution. Again I was select-
ed as the chairman, and I edited a report on corpo-
rate social contribution, which was published in
1975. Unfortunately, at the time when these two
reports were published, the bubble economy
burst, and business circle lost interest in corporate
social responsibility. In the 1980s, Tokyo
Metropolitan Government published every year
social indicators for all of the 48 prefectures in
Japan. I worked to make the social indicators for
5 years as the chairman of the Social Indicator
Research Committee in Tokyo.
Designing 'Welfare Mix'
In the conventional welfare state, "flow-based
policies" such as demand management and in-
come redistribution played dominant roles in sta-
bilizing the economy and achieving a fairer distri-
bution of income. The Swedish Professor Assar
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Lindbeck once deplored the fact that the welfare
state was '--- transformed into a "transfer state"
with policy-induced redistribution'. He empha-
sized in particular the importance of 'attempts to
redistribute the ownership of human capital, fi-
nancial capital and physical assets in favour of
low and low-middle income groups' (Lind-
beck,1993) . In the new welfare society, assets and
asset-based economic policies and egalitarian as-
set-based welfare policies will play important
roles. It is necessary to make the market system
and economic justice compatible. 
Another important difference between the con-
ventional welfare state and the post-welfare soci-
ety has to do with the composition of the econom-
ic and social system. The conventional welfare
state is a mixed economy comprising an econom-
ic market system and a political planned system,
while in the post-welfare society the third system
will play a more important role than in the con-
ventional welfare state (Maruo, 1984). The third
system is the social and informal system. In The
Japanese Model of a Welfare Society published in
1984, in the course of explaining the differences
in the new model of a welfare society, I pointed
out that not only the government, but also the
market and informal systems such as family and
voluntary organizations will play important roles. 
'It is not only the government that provides and
produce 'welfare'. The market sector, the informal
sector and mixed sectors should be given more
importance as providers and producers of 'wel-
fare' (Maruo, 1984, p.175) 10'. 
In the same book, I used Chart 4 (below) to il-
lustrate the concept of the welfare mix in visual
terms 11.
Each system has its own system of governance
as Table 1 indicates.
A well-designed welfare mix is required to mit-
igate the increasing burden of social security and
environmental costs. The market system guided
by the invisible hand of the market mechanism
aims mainly at improving efficiency, while the
planned system based on political democracy
aims mainly at improving equality or justice. In
addition, the social and informal system is impor-
tant in solving the problems that neither the mar-
ket system nor the planned system can resolve.
The social and informal system pursues human
values such as solidarity, sympathy and mutual
trust, which are inaccessible to the market system
based on self-interest. The larger the market sys-
tem, where people behave on the basis of self-in-
terest, becomes, the more important is the role ex-
pected for the informal sector, where people be-
have on the basis of sympathy and mutual trust.
To realize these plural policy objectives, plural
systems are necessary (See Table 1 and Maruo,
2002).
As Jan Tinbergen's theorem suggests, to realize
plural policy objectives, the same number of poli-
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Chart 4  Concept of Welfare Mix � 
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cy means are necessary. Therefore, to realize con-
flicting plural policy objectives, a policy mix
strategy is required as suggested by J. E. Meade
and Robert Mundel. I learned the principle of pol-
icy mix and the importance of asset ownership in
a market economy from J. E. Meade when I was
staying at Cambridge University. A welfare mix
model is an analogical application of the concept
of policy mix to an economic system. 
The welfare needs of the people may be as-
sumed to be better satisfied and they may be as-
sumed to be better off if resources are allocated
across the three systems so that the total system
approaches close to the optimum mix. In their
edited book, The Welfare State: East and West,
1886, Richard Rose and Rei Shiratori considered
three types of welfare state, namely the US, Scan-
dinavian countries and Japan. In Scandinavian
countries, the share of the political and planned
system G in Chart 4 is assumed to be relatively
large, while in the US, that of the economic and
market system M is dominant. In Japan, the role
of the family in the social and informal system F
is relatively large. In Japan, families have played
more important roles, for example, in caring and
nursing the elderly and children, than in Scandi-
navian countries12.
In order to satisfy the increasing need for wel-
fare services and to maintain a steady economic
growth at a time of financial difficulties, it is nec-
essary to develop new economic and welfare poli-
cies. 
First, as mentioned above, the Japanese model
of an optimum welfare mix (Rose & Shiratori,
1986; Maruo, 1984, Kato & Maruo, 2002) is expect-
ed to lessen the excess burden of tax and social
security contributions in future on the one hand
and the heavy burden of families, mainly women,
in caring for the elderly and children on the other.
A welfare mix will be required in terms of pen-
sion provision (Wadensjö, 1997; Maruo, 2004).
Health and personal social services have to be
changed so that the market system and the infor-
mal system including NPOs play more important
roles in providing those services in future not on-
ly directly but also contracting in public services.
Organizations in the public sector must be re-
formed so as to make them more market-oriented
and efficient (Maruo, 1996). The government,
however, will continue to play an important role
in providing the social services to meet basic
needs of the people and providing the framework
of fair competition. This is necessary to avoid se-
rious market failures. 
Second, asset-based economic policies and
egalitarian asset-based welfare policies have to be
developed. The more important the roles played
by markets, the more important are the roles re-
quired for asset policies. A policy mix of more
markets with fairer share of asset ownership is
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System or Policy Means
Political & planned system
Economic & market system
Social & informal system (Family,
NPO, volunteer, etc.) 
Main policy objective
Equality
Efficiency
Humanity
Table 1  Social Systems, their Policy Objectives and Functions
Main governance function
Democracy based on majority rule
Market exchange based on market mechanism
Social exchange & reciprocity based on mutual
trust & social integration
necessary in order to realize efficiency and equity
at the same time. This was what I wanted to insist
on in my book Market-Oriented Welfare Reform
in 1996 (Maruo, 1996). Chart 6 illustrates the dif-
ference between the conventional welfare state
and a new market-oriented welfare state from two
points of view. Firstly, the conventional welfare
state assumed that the mixed economy consists of
the government sector and the market sector,
while the new market-oriented welfare state as-
sumes that the welfare mix consists of three sec-
tors. Secondly, the conventional welfare state de-
pends too much on income redistribution policies,
which were sometimes in conflict with the market
system and efficiency. The market-oriented wel-
fare state attaches more importance to the distri-
bution of social and financial assets. The conven-
tional welfare state is shown as A in Chart 5. It
will change from A and move in the direction of
the market-oriented welfare state shown as B in
the Chart .
Besides, in Japan, the government has to make
the maximum use of production potential by de-
veloping "welfare industries " and by encouraging
the employment of the potential labour forces of
seniors and females. The life expectancy of the
Japanese people is longest in the world, while the
official retirement and pensionable age are the
youngest among the highly developed nations.
The labour participation ratio of females in .Japan
is 55～59 % and the female-male earnings differ-
entials are, in a cross-national comparative con-
text, very large. In labour markets "There is a
high degree of gender segregation" (le Grand and
Tshiko Tsukaguchi-le Grand, 2005). If the labour
participation ratio increases and the pensionable
age of the elderly is raised, the dependency ratio
in Eq. (16) and (19), and the financial situation of
public pension funds will be remarkably im-
proved13. However, if the present low total fertili-
ty rate in Japan continues, the public pension will
go bankrupt in the future. In the long-run, im-
provement of the total fertility rate is necessary. It
can also be assumed that there is a possibility, as
Chart 6 suggests, that a U-shaped curve will arise
in respect of the total fertility rate. However, the
total fertility rate in highly developed countries
will not improve automatically. Scandinavian
countries and France succeeded in improving the
total fertility rate after experiencing low fertility
rate by introducing prodactive family policies and
female-friendly working conditions. . 
Improving the dependency ratio by increasing
the labour participation ratio on the one hand and
improving the total fertility rate by providing
favourable conditions for working women on the
other hand is a possible policy-mix in present-day
Japan. 
By developing the above-mentioned policies, it
is quite possible to maintain a steady rate of eco-
nomic growth and a sustainable welfare system at
the same time.
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Chart 5  From Conventional Welfare State to Market-Oriented Welfare State
More importance on�
distribution of social and �
financial assets
Redistribution of income
Mixed economy of government and markets Welfare mix
A
B
Egipt 
Mexico
Iceland
Denmark
Norway
US
Luxemburg
0 10000 20000 30000
Per Capita GDP, US dollar （X）�
Y = 2.399 - 5.642E-5   X + 9.276E-10   X^2; R^2 = 0.25
Source: ICA�
Statistics, OECD.
40000 50000 60000
3�
2.75�
2.5�
2.25�
2�
1.75�
1.5�
1.25�
1�
.75
Chart 6  U-Shaped Curve in the Total Fertility Rate （Y） 
Ｙ�
References
In English 
Englund, Peter (1999) 'The Swedish Banking Crisis :
Roots and Consequences', Oxford Review of Eco-
nomic Policy, Vol.15, No.3．
Esping-Andersen (2002), Why We Need a New Welfare
State?, Oxford University Press.
Fabricant, Solomon, John K. Kendrick, Naomi Maruo,
e al (1984), Measuring Productivity, UNIPUB,
USA.
Harrod, Roy (1967), Towards a New Economic Policy,
London.
Jongus, Lars and Joakin Stymne (1997), 'The Great
Regime Shift: Asset Market and Economic Activity
in Sweden', in Forrest Capie and Geoffrey E. Wood-
eds Asset Prices and the Real Economy, Basing-
stock, Macmillan
Lewis, Arthur. W. (1959), "Economic Development
with Unlimited Supplies of Labor" in Paradigms in
Economic Development, Rajani Kanth, ed., M.E.
Sharpe.Armonk, New York, 1994.
Kaldor, Nicholas (1960), Essays on Value and Income
Distribution, London.
Kaldor, Nichlas (1964), Essays on Economic Policy,
London.
Keister, Lisa A., Wealth in America: Trends in Wealth
Inequality, Cambridge University Press, 2000.
Kuznets, Simon (March, 1955), "Economic Growth
and Income Inequality" in The American Economic
Review.
le Grand Karl and Toshiko Tsukaguchi-le Grand
(2005) in Maruo, Naomi, Andre Björklund and Karl
le Grand eds. (2004), Welfare Policy and Labour
Markets, Almqvist International.
Lindbeck, Assar (1993), The Welfare State: The Select-
ed Essays of Assar Lindbeck, Vol.Ⅱ, Edward Ekgar. 
Macrae, Norman (1963), Sunshades in October, Lon-
don.
Maruo (1965)‘Structural Transformation of the
Japanese Economy', Journal of Economics
(Keizaigakuronsan), Chuo University, November,
1965. 
Maruo, Naomi (May 1983) " An Econometric Analysis
of the Relationship between Labour-Management
Relations and Productivity Increase", The Journal of
Economics, Vol. 24, No 3. 
Maruo, Naomi (1989), Economic Policy Management,
Chuo University Press.
Maruo, Naomi (1997), 'Japanese Management Prac-
tices: Their Implication on Productivity, Employ-
ment and Income Distribution' International Journal
of Production Economics, 52.
Maruo (may 2006) "Development of the Welfare State:
Redesigning Market and Dsitribution Policies" in
Nihon University Kiyou.
Maruo, Naomi, Andre Björklund and Karl le Grand eds
(2004), Welfare Policies and Labour Markets,
Almqvist International.
Rein, Martin and Eskil Wadensjö (1997) Enterprise
and the Welfare state, Edward Elgar.
Regan, Sue (2001) Asset-Based Welfare: International
Experiences, IPPR.
Regan, Sue (2001) Asset-Based Progressive Welfare,
IPPR.
Rose, Richard and Rei Shiratori, eds. (1986) Welfare
State: East and West, Oxford University Press．
Suzuki, Kenji (1999), Rethinking Japanese Bad Loan
Management, European Institute of Japanese
Studies, Working Paper Series 93, Stockholm
School of Economics.
Vissel Jelle, "Gösta Rehn, the Swedish Model and the
Dutch Miracle", in Milner, Henry and Eskil Waden-
sjö eds.(2001), Gösta Rehn the Swedish Model and
Labour Market Policies: International Perspective,
Ashgate.
Wadensjö, Eskil and Naomi Maruo (2001), Changing
Labour Market and Economic Policy, Life Design
Institute, Tokyo.
In Japanese 
Kato, Hiroshi & Naomi Maruo, eds. (1963, January),, "
Trend in the Capital / Output Ratio and Relative In-
come Share, Mita Keizaigaku Zashi, Tokyo.
Kato, Hiroshi and Naomi Maruo (2002), Designing
Welfare Mix, Yuhikaku.
Maruo, Naomi (1962), "The Stage of Economic Devel-
opment and Income Distribution", Mita Jjournal of
Economics.
Maruo, Naomi (March, 1963) 'Structural Transforma-
tion of the Japanese Economy', Journal of Eco-
nomics, Chuo University. 
Maruo, Naomi (1969), " Relation between Economic
Growth and Price Increase, " in Journal of Eco-
nomics：Against Conventional Wisdom, Chuo Uni-
versity Press..
Maruo, Naomi & Yoshitaka Fujita (1965年) A New
Theory on the Share of Wages, Diamond Press. 
Maruo, Naomi (March, 1973) Financial Plan for Public
Pension", Weekly Social Security.
Maruo, Naomi (March, 1973) "A Model and planning
尚美学園大学総合政策研究紀要第11号／2006年３月
16
for Social Security". in Mutou, Tadayoshi, Naomi
Maruo and Kaoru Sumiya, Economics of Welfare,
Seirin Shobou.
Maruo, Naomi (1975), Economic Policies for Welfare,
Nihonkeizai Sinbunsya 
Maruo, Naomi (1984), Japanese Model of Welfare
State, Japan Brordcast Corporation.
Maruo, Naomi (1996), Market-Oriented Welfare Re-
form, Nihon Keizai Shinbunsha. 
Maruo, Naomi (1993), "Depression in the 1990s and
Asset Policies" in Journal of Economics, Chuo Uni-
versity Press, March 1999.
Maruo, Naomi (2002), "Anti-Depression Policy to
Cope with Asset-Based Depression: Implication as
Compared with the Swedish Experience", Annual
Report of the Institute for Economic Studies No.32,
Chuo University, March 1999..
Maruo, Naomi (2003), "Economic Development and
Kuznets Curves on Income Distribution and Envi-
ronmental Quality, Mita Journal of Commerce.
Maruo, Naomi (March 2004), "Market-Oriented and
Asset-Based Pension Reform： lessens from
Swedish Experiences, Shobi University Quarterly.
Notes
１．I want to thank Mr. Maurice Jenkins, a British ex-
patriate living in Tokyo, for proofreading the draft of
my paper.
２．Here the share of wages = employees' compensa-
tion / gross value added.
３．The share of wages in macro economy means em-
ployees compensation / (employees compensation +
asset incomes).
４．Assuming a simplified two sector model, the rela-
tionship is expressed as the following equation
(Kaldor, 1960 and 1964). Assuming Y W P= +n01 ,
Y I C= +
n02
, and I S=
n03
, 
{( ) }
Y
W s s vG s1 p w w　 = - - +
n04
, 
where Y W P= +
n01
, Y I C= +
n02
, >s sp w
n05
, and
Y
I vG=
n06
Y
n07
: National income, W
n08
: Wages, P
n09
: profits, I
n10
:
Investment, S
n11
: Saving, C
n12
: Consumption, sp
n13
:
Propensity to consume profits, sw
n14
: Propensity to
consume wages, v
n15
: Marginal capital / output ratio,
G
n16
: Rate of economic growth.
５．We assume that the value added of a firm is com-
posed of wages and profits.
６．It is of interest to note that if >S 0w
n17
, employees
build assets. Therefore savings from workers' assets
should be included in Eq. 9. However, if sw
n14
is
larger than sp
n13
, the fundamental mechanism
changes as Paul Samuelson and R. M. Solow once
suggested (Maruo, May 2006). 
７．According to BIS regulations, 45 % of the off- the
book property of a balance sheet is redeemed as net
worth.
８．Japan Productivity Center merged with Social and
Economic Congress and the new organization is now
called Japan Productivity Center for Social and Eco-
nomic Development. 
９．The papers presented at the Symposium were pub-
lished as a book (Fabricant et al).
10．This Chart was originally published in Maruo,
1984, p.74.
11．In "Japanese Model of the Welfare Society, the
term "welfare mix" was not used. It was Richard
Rose and Rei Shiratori who suggested the concept
(Rose and Shiratori., 1986). 
12．The classification of these three types of welfare
capitalism is well known as the name of Esping-An-
dersen (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Richard Rose and
Rei Shiratori classified the welfare supply system in-
to three types. They edited a book inviting scholars
from three type of welfare state, i.e. government-ori-
ented Scandinavian countries and the UK, the mar-
ket-oriented US and informal sector oriented Japan
(Rose & Siratori, 1986).
13．The financial difficulty in future social security
funds in Japan is sometimes over exaggerated. If the
proportion of the elderly 65 years old and over to the
total population becomes 28 % in 2030, the propor-
tion of social security benefits / national income ra-
tio will be 30-32% according to my estimate
(Wadensjö and Maruo eds.2001). A recent Govern-
ment estimates that even if the present social securi-
ty system changed, the proportion in the 2020s will
be lower than that of European countries so long as
the average rate of economic growth in real terms is
maintainted higher than 1.5%.
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